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Abstract
Recent studies have tested the preference axioms of completeness
and transitivity, and have detected other preference phenomena such
as unstability, learning- and tiredness e¤ects, ordering e¤ects and dom-
inance, in stated preference discrete choice experiments. However, it
has not been explicitly addressed in these studies which preference
models are actually being tested, and the connection between the sta-
tistical tests performed and the relevant underlying models of respon-
dent behavior has not been explored further. This paper tries to ll
that gap. We specically analyze the meaning and role of the prefer-
ence axioms and other preference phenomena in the context of stated
preference discrete choice experiments, and examine whether or how
these can be subject to meaningful (statistical) tests.
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1 Background and introduction
When researchers and practitioners build statistical models of individual be-
havior or welfare, they often assume that choices are guided by utility maxi-
mization or preferences in accordance with certain basic consistency require-
ments (sometimes called axioms).
In the particular context of consumer demand under (non-)linear budget
constraints, the utility maximizing hypothesis is, in theory, testable through
the revealed preference axioms. There is an extensive literature on this topic
and classical references include Houthakker [15], Richter [34], Afriat [1],
Diewert [7], Varian [47], Matzkin [26], and Matzkin and Richter [24]. More
recently, stochastic tests have been developed by Cox [6], Fleissig and Whit-
ney [12] and others.
Another line of the literature has indicated an increased interest in test-
ing the preference axioms of completeness and transitivity, and detecting
other preference phenomena such as unstability, learning- and tiredness ef-
fects, ordering e¤ects, dominance, etc., in stated preference discrete choice
experiments. Recent studies along these lines include Ryan et al. [37], Shiell
et al. [41], Carlsson and Martinsson [5], Johnson and Mathews [19], Sælens-
minde [44][45], Ryan and Bate [36], McIntosh and Ryan [32], San Miguel et
al. [38], Scott [39], and Ryan and San Miguel [35].
Stated preference discrete choice experiments are widely used, for ex-
ample in environmental evaluation, marketing- and transportation studies
and for evaluation of health states or health care services. In light of the
popularity of such experiments testing its preference foundation is of broad
interest. Further it can be motivated by stated preference experiments that
often have no real consequences for the respondents involved (and hence very
little can be assumed a priori about their behavior). Somewhat surprisingly,
though, the second line of literature has not explicitly addressed the question
of which preference models that are actually being tested and whether the
preference axioms (and other associated preference phenomena) are, in fact,
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subject to statistical testing under the given circumstances. Some of these
studies refer to the random utility model, with the explicit aim of testing
the underlying preference axioms, but the link between the statistical tests
performed and the random utility model of respondent behavior is typically
not fully explored, and it is questionable whether the proposed tests relate
to a validation of this model at all.
This paper is an attempt of a methodological and interpretive reappraisal.
We discuss how the preference axioms and other preference phenomena can
be specied meaningfully in relation to various discrete choice models, and
examine whether and how these can be subject to meaningful (statistical)
tests.
Section 2 begins by recalling the fundamentals concerning the role of the
axiom of completeness for (tests of) the utility maximizing hypothesis, ar-
guing that, within an abstract decision model, it is a technical assumption
that one may, or may not, impose initially, but it has no real behavioral sub-
stance. Theoretically, it does play a minor role for the veriable implications
of utility representations, but in the present context it is unlikely to have
much relevance, if any. Section 2.1 focusses on recent experimental studies.
Tests of the completeness axiom have recently drawn attention although we
shall argue that, within the relevant statistical models, it is meaningless to
test for completeness since it cannot be disentangled from random error. The
basic methodological issues we attempt to raise apply to detection of other
associated preference phenomena as well.
In case of repeated choices, discussed in Section 3, preferences are nat-
urally interpreted as choice frequencies (e.g., May [25]) and it becomes im-
possible to distinguish between coin-ip answers (interpreted as incom-
pleteness) and similarity of alternatives (interpreted as indi¤erence). Con-
sequently, tests for completeness cannot be performed within this model.
Tests for transitivity can be meaningful in relation to at least one statistical
model, and we suggest one way to perform such a test. Section 3.1 discusses
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recent experimental tests of the transitivity axioms which seem to be of a
very di¤erent kind.
In Section 4, we further connect this discussion to the random utility
model (McFadden [28]). Within the framework of this more structured
model, underlying preference relations are in a sense not only complete but
also transitive by construction. But, in Section 4.1, we suggest how vari-
ous other preference phenomena could be interpreted and detected within
extended versions of this model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The completeness axiom and tests of the
utility maximizing hypothesis
In experimental studies, tests of the axiom of completeness are sometimes
associated with tests of the utility maximizing hypothesis. Hence it seems
useful to recall the role of the completeness axiom in abstract utility theory.
Suppose that there is a nite set of alternatives X. A preference relation
is a binary relation % on X where we interpret x % y; x; y 2 X ; as \x is
at least a good as y". From % we dene strict preference  and indi¤erence
 in the usual way, i.e. x  y if x % y and not y % x; and x  y if
x % y and y % x:1 It is well-known that if % is complete (i.e. x % y or y % x
for all x; y 2 X) and transitive (i.e. x % y and y % z implies x % z), then
there exists a real-valued function u on X that represents % in the sense that
x % y , u(x)  u(y): (1)
However, completeness is not a precondition for utility maximization. Maxi-
mizing a utility function u is consistent with an underlying preference relation
1Some authors use strict preferences  as the primitive and dene weak preference %
and indi¤erence  from  (see e.g. Fishburn [9] for details). In a revealed preference
context, weak preference is often the natural starting point, since if x were chosen when y
was also available, x and y may or may not be indi¤erent.
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% if dominated alternatives are not selected, i.e. if
x  y ) u(x) > u(y): (2)
Given X and %; there exists a utility function u satisfying (2) if and only
if strict preference  is acyclic (i.e. there is not a nite t and a sequence
x1; x2; : : : ; xt such that x1  x2      xt  x1), cf., e.g., Fishburn [11].
We have therefore two interpretations of a utility representation, (1) and
(2), depending on whether completeness is assumed or not. In order to obtain
a representation (1), transitivity must hold, while in (2), acyclicity must hold.
Transitivity implies acyclicity but the converse is not true. Intransitivity and
cycles are however closely related preference phenomena and in practice one
often seeks to nd violations of transitivity by means of cycles (see, e.g.,
[25]). Thus cycles (or intransitivity for that matter), not incompleteness, is
the phenomenon of interest here.
The axiom of completeness only plays a role if, when imposing it, we can
point to intransitivities but not to cycles. To illustrate, suppose that there
are three alternatives X = fx; y; zg and x  y; y  z and x 6 z: Then
if completeness is assumed we must necessarily have z % x and there is no
utility representation in the sense of (1) due to the implied intransitivity of
%. On the other hand, without completeness x 6 z may indicate that x and
z cannot be compared with % and in this case a utility representation in the
sense of (2) exists.
In relation to tests of the utility maximizing hypothesis in discrete choice
experiments there is consequently no particular reason to assume that choice
observations are drawn from an underlying complete ordering rather than
from a partial ordering on the alternatives actually compared. For the pur-
pose of testing for the existence of a utility representation it su¢ ces to test
for cycles or intransitivity within the observed choices. Whether or not the
axiom of completeness is assumed is more or less a matter of taste.
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2.1 What is tested in recent studies?
In light of the very limited role of the axiom of completeness it may seem
surprising that recent papers are preoccupied with testing whether complete-
ness is satised or not in choice experiments, see, e.g., [41] and [35] (see also
[33] and [42]). Apparently, it is because experimenters nd that there is a
risk that respondents when confronted with various alternative options (that
are di¢ cult to grasp as for example in case of health care interventions or
environmental evaluation) have no well-formed preferences, but still try to
deliver an answer in order not to disappoint the experimenter. Such behav-
ior is then assumed to be revealed by conicting rankings in case of repeated
choice  taken as a sign of incompleteness.
But what is in fact tested in these studies? Ryan and San Miguel [35], for
example, develop a test for completeness interpreted as the assumption that
individuals have what they call well-dened preferencesfor any choice they
are presented to. In the experiment, two specic choice situations, choice A
and choice B, were both repeated during the experiments, with choice A
repeated before choice B was introduced (and then later repeated).2 In each
choice situation, two alternatives a and b were presented and the respondent
was asked to select one of the following options: 1) Strongly prefer a
2) Prefer a 3) Indi¤erent 4) Prefer b 5) Strongly prefer b. If no
reversals in stated preferences neither in the second round of choice A nor in
the second round of B was observed, Ryan and San Miguel interpret this as
(an indication of) complete preferences.3 If preference reversals occurred
both in A and B this was interpreted as incomplete preferences. Preference
reversal in A but not in B was interpreted as a learning e¤ect, and, nally,
if there was a preference reversal in B but not in A then the interpretation
was random error(or tiredness).
2The whole procedure was then again repeated in three waves.
3Certain changes in stated preferences, such as a change from strongly prefer a to
prefer a, was not counted for a preference reversal.
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We may try to get an intuitive grasp of the preference phenomena dis-
cussed by Ryan and San Miguel and others using Figure 1 (see below), where
we have also added a fourth possibility, unstable preferences. Figure 1 il-
lustrates for simplicity a binary choice situation with X = fx; yg where the
choice situation is repeated a number of times: In Figure 1A illustrates a situ-
ation where there is a preferred alternative x but random shocks occasionally
change observed choice (can be called random error). Figure 1B illustrates
a situation, where x and y cannot be meaningfully compared and the choices
- forced through by the analyst - are arbitrary (incomplete preferences).
In Figure 1C there is a learning e¤ect in the sense that preferences seemingly
converge after initial randomness (learning).4 Finally, in Figure 1D we
have illustrated another possibility, preferences are complete but change
over time (unstable preferences).
As Figures 1A and 1B illustrates, there is no point in distinguishing be-
tween incompleteness and random error since indecisiveness and noise cannot
be disentangled based on such choice observations.5 Hence, if the underly-
ing model is assumed to be a random preference/utility model (which seems
sensible provided that mistakes are to be expected in all choice experi-
ments) incompleteness cannot be separated from noise  this will be further
discussed in Section 4. Learning e¤ects, on the other hand, are quite dif-
ferent due to the fact that choices become more stable over time, i.e. noise
is reduced over time. By repeating a choice once we cannot distinguish be-
tween learning and measurement error. By repeating more than once we can
observe if stated preference seems to converge, see Section 4. Unstability,
as in Figure 1D, could be identied with positive autocorrelation between
4The word learningmay be imprecise since learning (in the sense of becoming more
well-informed or wiser) is not necessarily the same as convergence of choice. Choices
may, for example, initially be stable due to ignorance and gradual learning about the true
complexity of the matter (or preference for diversity) may introduce doubt  and thereby
unstability.
5Note that by chosing from the same choice sets twice, preference reversals cannot be
explained by menu-dependentchoice rules, see, e.g., Sen [40].
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successive choices, but such an e¤ect takes more than a single repetition to
disentangle from other types of e¤ects. In particular, testing the di¤erence
between learning and unstability is impossible using tests as in [35].6
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- tim e
Choice
RANDOM ERROR (A)
x
y q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
6
- tim e
Choice
INCOMPLETE PREFERENCES (B)
x
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LEARNING (C)
x
y q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
6
- tim e
Choice
UNSTABLE PREFERENCES (D)
x
y q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
Figure 1
Completeness interpreted as having well-formed preferences cannot be ac-
cepted or rejected on the basis of a standard questionnaire study, because
the results of such a study will always be reported in terms of relative fre-
quencies. If preference for x over y is dened as in a majority of cases x is
preferred to y, any two alternatives can be compared. The only exception
is the case where respondents can refuse to answer a question. Therefore, it
might be an idea as, e.g., suggested in Oliver [33], to add to each question
6The impossibility of making a clear distinction between incompleteness and noise is,
in fact, very well illustrated by the empirical examples in [35]. One of the examples
involves a set of questions concerning supermarket attributes, where the alternatives are
only vaguely specied. For instance, prices can be high, medium or low, without any
clear quantitative specication. Obviously, many respondents will react to this by simply
refusing to answer, or  as a more polite alternative  to give only vague answers. It is
really a matter of taste whether this should be taken as an indication of incompleteness,
an indication of noise, or an indication of alternatives that are di¢ cult to distinguish from
each other. Not surprisingly the number of imprecise preferences in the supermarket study
is, in most cases, higher than in the two other studies presented, where the description of
the alternatives is more precise.
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a response category labelled comparison meaningless. If all respondents
put their votes in that category we can, with some weight, conclude that
either the ordering is incomplete, or the alternatives are so vaguely dened
that the respondents are unable to answer. However, this category must cer-
tainly not be confused with the midcategory labelled indi¤erent, which
may very well be selected as the result of a careful comparison of welldened
alternatives.
3 Testing transitivity
Since inconsistency in binary choices essentially is related to intransitivi-
ties (or cycles) we shall now discuss whether tests for transitivity can be
performed. Assume, for simplicity, that we have a data set of pairwise com-
parisons for a given respondent facing repeated choices between alternatives
in a given set X, where each question has the form which of the following
two alternatives x and y do you prefer?.7 Consequently, we make the sim-
plifying assumption of unambiguous answers, i.e. answers like I dont know
or I am indi¤erentare not accepted.8
Now, let p(xjx; y) be the probability that x is chosen among alternatives
x and y. Since indi¤erence is not possible, we have
p(xjx; y) = 1  p(yjx; y):
Under our simplifying assumptions, the probabilities p(xjx; y) can be es-
timated by the corresponding relative frequencies p^(xjx; y). The preference
7It is easy to generalize the method presented here to the case where three or more
alternatives are presented in each comparison, see, e.g., Block and Marschak [3].
8As we shall discuss in Section 4, questions allowing for indi¤erence can, in a more
structured statistical model where transitivity is an inherent property, be handled simply
by exclusion of the indi¤erenceanswers from the data set.
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relation induced by the choice probabilities is given by
x % y , p(xjx; y)  1
2
;
and the estimate of this relation becomes, accordingly,
x%^y , p^(xjx; y)  1
2
:
Since any pair (x; y) of alternatives will satisfy either x % y or y % x,
a test for completeness is meaningless. Of course, it can be argued that
if p^(xjx; y) is close to 1/2 it is an indication of coinip answers, which
could be explained by the respondentslack of ability to perform a relevant
comparison. But it can also be taken, simply, as an indication of x and y
being very similar alternatives, and there is no way of distinguishing between
these two explanations.
However, a test for transitivity is possible. Transitivity of the induced
relation % means (ignoring ties p(xjx; y) = 1
2
which are not likely to occur)
that for any triple (x; y; z) we have9
[p(xjx; y) < 1
2
and p(yjy; z) < 1
2
] ) p(xjx; z) < 1
2
:
Thus, in order to test that a given triple (x; y; z) does not give rise to any
violation of transitivity, the following procedure will su¢ ce:
First, check whether the three comparisons (x; y), (y; z) and (x; z) all re-
sult in signicantly decisive conclusions. Or, equivalently, check by standard
binomial tests that all three estimates p^(xjx; y), p^(yjy; z) and p^(xjx; z) are
signicantly di¤erent from 1
2
. If this is not the case, transitivity must neces-
sarily be accepted as far as this triple is concerned. If the three comparisons
are decisive, check whether their ordering is in accordance with transitivity
9Or, equivalently, lack of transitivity means that there exists a triple (x; y; z) (think of
it as a 3cycle x ! y ! z ! x) for which the three probabilities p(xjx; y), p(yjy; z) and
p(zjz; x) are all less than 12 . Fishburn [10] surveys theories of stochastic transitivity.
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or not. If not (i.e. if the ordering is cyclic, which happens in 2 of the 8
possible cases), transitivity is rejected, otherwise it must be accepted.
An overall test for transitivity is, in principle, just a matter of doing this
for all possible triples. But here we must (in particular if many alternatives
are involved) take mass signicanceinto account, i.e. the phenomenon that
when many tests on level (say) 95% are performed, some of them will usually
be signicant just by accident. A procedure that takes this into account goes
as follows:
First, isolate all pairs (x; y) for which p^(xjx; y) is signicantly di¤erent
from 1
2
on a suitable level. This level should be determined in such a way
that we are almost certain that all these decisivecomparisons are actually
correct. Since there are
 
n
2

pairs of alternatives (where n is the number of
alternatives in X), the only way of ensuring this is to perform the tests on
level 1  = n
2

= 1  2=(n(n  1)), where  is chosen (as usual) to be 0.05
or 0.01 or whatever is preferred. In this way we can be sure that a false
decisive comparisonoccurs with probability at most . When these pairs
have been isolated, check that the corresponding graph has no cycles. If there
are cycles, transitivity is rejected, otherwise it cannot be rejected.
It is possible to invent more rened versions of this test. Iverson and
Falmagne [16] have a quite complicated study of the distributions of the
statistics related to this kind of hypothesis testing. But their basic idea is
the same, and we believe that the simple procedure proposed here will work
satisfactory in practice, at least when the number of alternatives is moderate.
The test suggested here is also related to a test for transitivity applied by
Tversky [46] in an experimental study, where the alternative to transitivity
was more narrowly specied by the nature of the experiment. Apart from
this, the procedure suggested here seems not to have been mentioned in the
literature before (see, however [3] and [17] for studies of related problems).
The reason for this is probably that the more structured statistical models
(like the random utility model) that are usually applied in this context have
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transitivity as an intrinsic property. Thus, the acceptance of one of the
models discussed in Section 4 (e.g. by an ordinary goodnessoft test) is an
implicit acceptance of transitivity.
A data set of pairwise comparisons could also be collected from a group
of respondents and we can imagine that the experimenter wants to test if
it is possible to interpret the choices as if they were all generated by a sin-
gle representative individualwith stochastic transitive preferences. In this
case it is more likely that a su¢ ciently large data set is available for statis-
tical testing. Problems of this kind might have interest from, e.g., a social
choice perspective. It is well-known, however, that transitivity of individual
preferences do not necessarily imply a transitive preference relation for the
representative individual and vice versa (e.g. May [25]).
3.1 Recent experimental studies
In recent literature on choice experiments, some studies, e.g., Sælensminde
[44][45], state that the transitivity axiom is tested using so-called Ray dia-
grams but it is not explicitly dened what is meant by transitivity, and it is
questionable whether the consistency tests performed relate to a test of this
axiom or other preference phenomena (such as linearity). Other studies, e.g.,
Carlsson and Martinsson [5] and McIntosh and Ryan [32] use a random utility
model but seem to disregard the stochastics when they test for transitivity
with the purpose of providing internal validation of their framework.
These studies are concerned with the absolute or relative number of re-
spondents that show some sort of intransitive behavior in at least one occa-
sion. If the number of comparisons performed by each respondent is large,
and if the alternatives are di¢ cult to distinguish, many of the respondents
are likely to get into some sort of self-contradictory behavior. But this does
not necessarily imply that there is an underlying preference relation which is
intransitive.
In relation to these tests of preference axioms, recent experimenters have
13
also been concerned with the idea of exclusion of data from respondents
(for further analysis data analysis) if the entire pattern of those respondents
choices do not pass all consistency checks. The choice models suggest that
there is no reason whatsoever to eliminate data, as long as the observed viola-
tions are within the range of what could be expected in the relevant statistical
model: Whereas experimenters should be free to interpret single deviations
from consistency checksas they want in its specic context, it would be
wrong to associate such consistency checks with validations of the relevant
discrete choice models or the use of such models for utility assessments in
applied welfare studies.
4 On testing preference axioms (and detect-
ing other preference phenomena) in the ran-
dom utility framework
In this section we discuss how concepts like incompleteness, learning, tired-
ness, and related issues can be analyzed in the framework of more structured
statistical models. For a general treatment of such models, see, e.g., McFad-
den [29].
Discrete comparisons, in this context, refers to a situation where a number
of respondents are confronted with a number of questions of the form which
of the following k alternatives do you prefer.10
The classical model for this kind of situations is the so-called Bradley
Terry model (see [4]), which can be stated as follows: Let x denote the (more
or less ctive) probability that a (random) respondent, when presented to the
entire setX = f1; : : : ; ng of alternatives, answers x. Thus, 1+  +n = 1,
provided that an answer must be given, which is assumed for the moment.
A crucial (and in some contexts questionable) assumption, called the
10The case k = 2 corresponds to the pairwise comparison setup of the previous section.
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axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives11, is that if only a subset of
the setX of alternatives is presented to the respondent, then the probabilities
can be derived from the situation involving the full set of alternatives as the
conditional probabilities, given that the choice happens to fall in the subset.12
For example, if three alternatives x, y and z are presented, we have (with an
obvious extension of the notation used in Section 4)
p(xjx; y; z) = x
x + y + z
:
A nice property of this model, which relates to our previous discussion
of completeness, is that it is consistent with the simplest possible handling
of dont knowanswers, in the following sense. If an indi¤erence category
 which can suitably be named 0  is added, and if we can rely on the
assumption that this alternative plays a role which is similar to any other
alternative, then the dont know answers can be handled simply by re-
moving them from the data set. For example, if two alternatives x and y are
presented, the probability of choosing x when indi¤erence is allowed becomes
p(xjx; y; 0) = x
x + y + 0
:
But the conditional probability of selecting x, given that either x or y is
selected becomes
p(xjx; y) = x
x + y
which according to the assumption coincides with the probability of selecting
x when 0 is not among the alternatives presented.
Another nice property is automatic transitivity of the induced prefer-
11See, e.g., Luce [22], Marschak [23] and McFadden [28].
12The drawback of this assumption is that one can easily invent examples where it is
unrealistic. If a pair fx; yg of clearly distinct alternatives is extended by an alternative z
which appears very similar to x, then it is not likely that the probability of selecting y will
become much smaller  though this is actually what the formula suggests. Nevertheless,
the model has been widely applied
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ence relation. Indeed, since x  y is obviously equivalent to x < y, the
transitivity condition reduces to the trivial statement
x < y and y < z ) x < z :
This result is further supported by the result noticed by McFadden [28] that
the BradleyTerry model can be derived as a random utility model, i.e. a
model that explains the choice made by a respondent as the one that max-
imizes the utility over the alternatives presented. Since choices vary from
occasion to occasion and between respondents, this utility function has to
be random.13 More specically, let v be a function which to each alternative
x 2 X assigns a real number v(x), which can be interpreted as a sort of
average utility in the population. The random utilities determining the
choices are assumed to take the form
Uri(x) = v(x) + "xri;
where "xri is a random variable associated with alternative x in the ith
choice performed by respondent r. These error termsare assumed to be
independent and identically distributed, and the choice made by a respondent
in any choice situation is assumed to be the choice that maximizes the value
of the random utility function Uri.14
Falmagne [8], McFadden and Richter [31] and others have established
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for theoretical choice probabilities to be
13The random preference model o¤ers a quite distinct stochastic specication, see, e.g.,
Loomes and Sugden [20].
14What McFadden [28] showed was that if the common distribution of the "xri is assumed
to be the normalized extreme value distribution (c.d.f. P ("xri  z) = exp(  exp( z))),
then this model coincides with the Bradley-Terry model with parameters
xi =
exp(v(xi))
exp(v(x1)) +   + exp(v(xk)) ;
for alternatives X = fx1; : : : ; xkg.
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consistent with random utility maximization. McFadden [30] contains many
references. Stochastic tests, however, have been much less developed; albeit,
see Koning and Ridder [18] for a related study.
4.1 Tests of preference phenomena
There is an extensive literature on tests of various types of respondent be-
havior in a random utility framework, and we shall refrain from an attempt
to survey this broad eld (see, however, Hensher et al. [13], Louviere [21],
and Swait and Adamowicz [43] for other recent discussions). Rather, we
shall try to synthesize how some of the previously mentioned, and somewhat
vaguely dened, preference phenomena related to discrete comparisons can
be formalized and tested within the framework of the random utility model.
The fact that incompleteness is indistinguishable from close similarity of
alternatives is clearly demonstrated by the model when a scale parameter is
introduced for the error term of the random utility function. If we write the
random utility as
Uri(x) = v(x) + "xri
where  is a scale parameter, similar to the standard deviation in a regression
model ("xri is still assumed to be normalized extreme value distributed), it
becomes clear that a large degree of incompleteness (meaning that respon-
dents seem to give their answers more or less at random) is equivalent to a
large value of , whereas close similarity of alternatives means that the values
v(x) all lie in some narrow interval. But it is well-known that an upscaling of
the function v is equivalent to a downscaling of the error term "xri, and vice
versa, and it is an intrinsic property of this model that it cannot distinguish
between these two phenomena. To avoid this overparametrization we may as
well take  = 1 in the model where  is constant (see, e.g., Ben-Akiva and
Lerman [2]).
In addition, the idea of a scale parameter on the error term allows us to
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build a learning e¤ect into the model in the following way. If respondents are
exposed to the same set of alternatives several times, or to di¤erent combi-
nations involving the same alternatives, a learning e¤ect may be interpreted
as respondents becoming more and more stable and consistent in their se-
lections. This phenomenon becomes possible in the model if we allow for a
scale parameter i that varies from occasion to occasion (i). If i decreases,
a learning e¤ect is present. The phenomenon that i increases at some point
seems to be appropriately described by the word tiredness.
Heterogeneity between respondents can also be modelled. In practice,
a realistic expectation is that the random variation from respondent to re-
spondent is more pronounced than the variation from occasion to occasion
for the same respondent. Moreover, a specic respondent may very well
show a stable behavior which is di¤erent from that of another respondent.
The deterministic utility function v(x) represents a kind of population av-
erage, but respondents may have individual preferences that are di¤erent
from this average. A model that takes this into account could be a variance
componenttype model based on a random utility function of the form
Uri(x) = v(x) + !xr + "xri
where !xr is an error term of the same kind as "xri, except that it is specic
to the alternative x and the respondent r, but independent of the occasion
i. Computationally, this model is di¢ cult to handle, but conceptually this is
exactly what is needed to describe heterogeneity between respondents. This
model is not equivalent to a BradleyTerry model or any other simple model.
Models of this kind are usually specied with normal rather than extreme
value distributed error terms.
An indi¤erence category can be incorporated in the model in a simple
way, which in most cases is likely to be more realistic than the ignoranceof
indi¤erencecases method proposed earlier. Consider for simplicity the case
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of pairwise comparisons. Instead of assuming
Choice =
(
x if Uri(x) > Uri(y)
y if Uri(x) < Uri(y)
we could assume, for some parameter 0 > 0 which can be interpreted as the
least noticeable utility di¤erence, that
Choice =
8><>:
x if Uri(x) > Uri(y) + 0
0 if jUri(x)  Uri(y)j  0
y if Uri(x) < Uri(y)  0:
One might even consider models where the parameter 0 varies from re-
spondent to respondent, in accordance with the fact that some people are
more hesitant with decisive conclusions than others. A similar model 
with an additional parameter 1 > 0 to determine the threshold between
preferenceand strong preference can be used in situations where the
responses are given on (say) a vepoint scale (as, e.g., in [35]). These mod-
els are closely related to the models for discrete ordinal data described in
McCullagh [27].
As a nal remark we mention the possibility of taking a preferencefor
rstmetalternative parameter into the model. The order in which alter-
natives are presented may inuence the decision taken, typically by giving
a higher probability to the alternatives presented rst. For this reason, it is
important to balance the questionnaires in such a way that the alternatives
presented are not always given in the same order. Provided that this has
been done, there is a rather straightforward way of building this into the
model. In the case of pairwise comparisons, it can be done by the introduc-
tion of an extra preferenceforrstmetparameter, which is simply added
to the deterministic utility functions value for the rst alternative before
the maximization. If the utility function is written as a linear combination
of covariate values, this has the simple interpretation that the property of
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being presented rst is an extra measure of quality (represented by a dummy
covariate) with potential (positive or negative) inuence on the choice. For
triplewise comparisons and higher, it becomes a bit more complicated.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the possibilities for embedding tests of pref-
erence axioms within probabilistic choice models. We have in particular
discussed the role of completeness and transitivity, and provided some sug-
gestions for dealing with notions like learning or tiredness, heterogeneity,
indi¤erence categories and ordering e¤ects within the random utility model.
It has been argued that both completeness and transitivity in theory play
a role but the empirical relevance of particularly the completeness axiom
is strongly limited. Transitivity can be tested within a frequency of choice
model, although for most realistic data sets it seems unlikely that transitivity
can be rejected at the individual level. In this respect it seems reasonable to
work with statistical models that treat these properties as inherent.
Having said that, it should be emphasized that we do not in any respect
want to downplay the importance of internal and external validations of dis-
crete choice models. Although statistical test are sometimes meaningless in
relation to specic models, critical investigations of respondentsability to
deliver meaningful, reliable, and useful answers in stated preference experi-
ments are no less needed.
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